Security Model

IFA Oracle security architecture, access control, and best practices

Role Hierarchy & Permissions

Permission Matrix

Role	Contract	Function Access	Purpose
Owner	IfaPriceFeed	setVerifier(), transferOwnership()	Administrative control
Owner	IfaPriceFeedVerifier	setRelayerNode(), transferOwnership()	Relayer management
Verifier Contract	IfaPriceFeed	setAssetInfo()	Price data updates
Relayer Node	IfaPriceFeedVerifier	submitPriceFeed()	Price submission
Public	IfaPriceFeed	getAssetInfo(), getPairById(), etc.	Read operations

Security Features

Access Control Protection

• Two-level Authorization: Owner → Verifier → Relayer chain prevents single point of failure
• Role Separation: Clear separation between administrative, validation, and data submission roles
• Address Verification: Cryptographic verification of caller addresses at each level

Data Integrity Safeguards

• Input Validation: Multi-layer validation pipeline prevents malformed data injection
• Timestamp Verification: Protection against stale data and replay attacks
• Decimal Bounds Checking: Prevents overflow/underflow in precision calculations
• Existence Validation: Asset existence checks prevent undefined behavior

Operational Security

• Round ID Tracking: Prevents replay attacks and ensures data freshness
• Batch Atomicity: All-or-nothing batch operations prevent partial state corruption
• Zero Division Protection: Mathematical safeguards prevent calculation errors
• Gas Limit Considerations: Function design prevents DoS through gas exhaustion

Trust Model & Assumptions

Trust Requirements

1. Relayer Node Integrity: Trusted to provide accurate, timely price data
2. Owner Responsibility: Trusted to manage verifier and relayer assignments appropriately
3. Network Security: Depends on underlying blockchain consensus and finality

Attack Vector Analysis

High Risk Mitigated:

• ✅ Unauthorized Price Updates: Prevented by multi-layer access control
• ✅ Price Manipulation: Limited to authorized relayer with validation pipeline
• ✅ Replay Attacks: Prevented by round ID tracking and timestamp validation
• ✅ Data Corruption: Prevented by input validation and atomic operations

Medium Risk Monitored:

• ⚠️ Relayer Compromise: Single relayer failure impacts data freshness
• ⚠️ Oracle Front-running: Price updates visible before block confirmation
• ⚠️ Network Congestion: May delay price updates during high network load

Low Risk Accepted:

• ℹ️ MEV Extraction: Read-only oracle data may enable MEV opportunities
• ℹ️ Gas Price Volatility: May affect update frequency economics

Security Best Practices for Integrators

Safe Integration Patterns

// Always check asset existence
(PriceFeed memory price, bool exists) = oracle.getAssetInfo(assetId);
require(exists, "Asset not supported");

// Validate data freshness
require(block.timestamp - price.lastUpdateTime <= MAX_STALENESS, "Price too old");

// Handle potential zero prices
require(price.price > 0, "Invalid price data");

// Use appropriate precision scaling
uint256 scaledPrice = price.price * (10 ** targetDecimals) / (10 ** uint256(price.decimal));

Circuit Breaker Integration

// Implement price change limits
uint256 priceChangePercent = abs(newPrice - lastPrice) * 100 / lastPrice;
require(priceChangePercent <= MAX_PRICE_CHANGE, "Price change too large");

// Implement emergency pause capability
require(!emergencyPaused, "Oracle emergency pause active");